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PROACTIVE CORPORATE-SHAREHOLDER
RELATIONS: FILLING THE
COMMUNICATIONS VOID
Beth-ann Roth*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commis-
sion") recently amended its rules governing shareholder proposals.'
While the efforts of the Commission in this area are to be commended,
the emphasis has unfortunately remained on the portion of the process
that occurs after communications between shareholders and corporate
management have already failed, or, worse yet, not even begun. The
shareholder proposal rules encourage an adversarial approach to the re-
lationship between the parties without fostering any kind of productive
communications.
The purpose of this article is to explore what the author believes is a
need to build into the corporate-shareholder communications structure a
more formal mechanism for developing procedures pursuant to which
shareholders can discuss their concerns with corporate management on
an ongoing basis, and by which companies are encouraged to approach
shareholders directly instead of solely via disclosure documents. Direct
communication is more likely to lead to results with which both sides can
be satisfied, and may more often lead to a resolution of issues without re-
sort to the contentious shareholder proposal process. On those occasions
when a vote of shareholders is appropriate to decide an issue of company
policy, amicable communications among the parties well in advance of
submission deadlines could result in a proposal crafted by consensus, or
at least with substantive input from management.
* Ms. Roth is a member of the Investment Management and Latin American Practice
Groups of Dechert Price & Rhoads in Washington, D.C., and acknowledges the help of
Paul Spackman in preparing this article. She formerly was in-house counsel for an invest-
ment management firm, a lobbyist on business issues, and has served as a member of the
staff of the SEC. Ms. Roth has been actively involved in matters regarding corporate-
shareholder communications for the past fourteen years.
1. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The amendments af-
fect Rules 14a-4, 14a-5, and 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §§
240.14a-4, -5, -8 (1997). Details of the amendments are discussed below.
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II. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND PROXY VOTING
An essential part of the corporate governance process is for sharehold-
ers to be able to communicate both with corporate management and with
each other. How this has been achieved over the years has been primar-
ily through the shareholder proposal process.
Shareholder proposals serve an essential function in the U.S. corporate
governance arena.' "The very opportunity to submit proposals, even of
an advisory nature, affords a safety valve for shareholder expression at a
price to management that would seem to be relatively slight."3  In a
meaningful way, the shareholder proposal process has provided an im-
portant mechanism for allowing shareholders to exercise their corporate
franchise and communicate with management on issues of importance to
them.4
One way for shareholders to present an issue for a vote is to attend a
company's annual meeting of shareholders in person and present the
matter from the floor. However, because most shareholders do not at-
tend the annual meetings in person, they would not, in this manner, have
the benefit of learning about and voting on the issue being presented.
Rather, the more prevalent means for a shareholder to present a matter
for a vote is by having the question disseminated to other shareholders in
2. Much has been written about the shareholder proposal process, its history and
adequacy. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 520, 541-42 (1990); see generally Marilyn B. Cane, The Revised SEC Shareholder
Proxy Proposal System: Attitudes, Results and Perspectives, 11 J. CORP. L. 57 (1985); Ken-
neth R. Propp, The SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Corporate Accountability at a
Crossroads, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1983); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Share-
holder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97 (1988). For interesting
analyses from a historical perspective, see The Seamless Symposium, 34 U. DET. L.J. 517
(1957) (including John G. Ledes, A Review of Proper Subject Under the Proxy Rules (at
520); Frank D. Emerson, Some Sociological and Legal Aspects of Institutional and Indi-
vidual Participation Under the SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule (at 528); Milton V. Free-
man, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder's Proposal Rule (at
549); Lewis D. Gilbert, An Independent Shareholder Appraisal (at 558); David C. Bayne,
S.J., The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject (at 575); and John J. Slavin, Proper Subject in a
Nutshell (at 615)).
3. Cane, supra note 2, at 57.
4. See Regulation of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No.
29,315, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,987, 28,987 (1991) (proposed June 25, 1991) (not adopted). Share-
holders "exercise their right - some would say their duty" of corporate governance
through the exercise of their corporate franchise. Id. at 28,988 n.l (quoting Medical
Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot,
404 U.S. 403 (1972)) ("[Slhareholders ... control the important decisions which affect
them in their capacity as stockholders and owners of the corporation."). See also SEC v.
Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517 (3d Cir. 1947) ("A corporation is run for the benefit
of its stockholders and not for that of its managers.").
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the company's proxy statement preceding the annual meeting. "Proxies
have become an indispensable part of corporate governance because the
'[r]ealities of modern corporate life have all but gutted the myth that
shareholders in large publicly held companies personally attend [sic] an-
nual meetings."' 5
In order to present a matter before the shareholder body for a vote, a
shareholder files a proposal with the secretary of the corporation and re-
quests that the proposal be included in the proxy statement mailed be-
fore an annual or special meeting.6 There are minimum share ownership
requirements and holding periods, as well as time restrictions for filing a
proposal.7 The shareholder may include with the request a supporting
statement that will accompany the voting item in the proxy statement.
Once a corporation receives a shareholder proposal, it has several op-
tions. The corporation can simply include the proposal in its proxy
statement and may add a statement regarding its views on how share-
holders should vote on the matter.9 Alternatively, representatives of the
corporation may believe that the corporation has a legal right to omit the
proposal from its proxy statement because the proposal falls under one
of the enumerated exclusions of the shareholder proposal rules.0 Bases
for exclusion include that the proposal: (1) is not a proper subject for ac-
tion under state law; (2) would require a violation of the law to imple-
ment; (3) would result in putting forth false or misleading information in
a proxy statement; (4) would result in a personal benefit to an individual
shareholder, and not to the group as a whole; (5) relates to operations
accounting for less than 5% of assets, and is not significantly related to
the company's business; (6) relates to a matter beyond the company's
control to implement; (7) deals with the ordinary business operations of
the company; (8) concerns an election of office; (9) is counter to a pro-
posal being submitted by the company; (10) is moot; (11) substantially
duplicates one already being included as submitted by another propo-
5. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F.
Supp. 877, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 86 (Del. 1992)).
6. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1997).
7. See id. § 240.14a-8(a)(1), -8(a)(3).
8. See id. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
9. See id. § 240.14a-8(e). If the company chooses to include a statement in opposi-
tion to the proposal, it must send a copy of the statement to the shareholder proponent. If
the proponent believes the statement in opposition is materially false or misleading in con-
travention of Exchange Act Rule 14a-9; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1997), the proponent may
so advise the SEC staff in writing. See id. § 240.14a-8(e).
10. See id. § 240.14a-8(c).
1998]
Catholic University Law Review
nent; and (12) does not meet resubmission thresholds.1'
If the company believes the proposal may be omitted pursuant to one
of the enumerated exclusions, it must notify the SEC in writing of man-
agement's intent to omit the shareholder proposal from the company's
proxy statement." In response to the written submission, the SEC staff
will either concur or decline to concur with the company's assessment of
the proposal's excludability. 3 While the SEC staff cannot dictate what
action the company takes, if the staff refuses to concur, and the company
omits the shareholder proposal, the staff may decide to refer the matter
to the SEC's Division of Enforcement for further review. Likewise, a
concurring opinion by the SEC staff does not mean that the company
may lawfully omit the proposal; the shareholder is free to seek redress
through the courts. 4 Such a course of action, however, is costly for all
parties involved and often deters shareholders from pursuing what they
believe to be their state-law right to vote on a matter concerning the
policy formation of the company they own.
There are also courses of action between those described above. For
example, shareholders may first approach a company to discuss the mat-
ter of concern, and, depending on the level of response, may choose not
to file a shareholder proposal. Alternatively, a company that has re-
ceived a shareholder proposal may reach out to the shareholder and at-
tempt to resolve the issue without putting forth the matter for a vote of
the entire shareholder body, and the satisfied shareholder may then
choose to withdraw its resolution. 5 It is the time period preceding the
shareholder proposal process that appears to merit more formal guid-
ance from the SEC.
III. SEC RULES GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND PROXY
VOTING
The shareholder proposal rules provide a mechanism by which share-
16holders, particularly small investors, may voice their views and concerns
11. See id.; infra Part III.A.2. (ordinary business exclusion); infra Part III.B.1. (per-
sonal claim or grievance exclusion); infra Part III.B.2. (little economic relevance exclu-
sion); infra Part III.B.3. (resubmisson requirement).
12. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d).
13. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682 (1997) (proposed Sept. 26, 1997).
14. See id.
15. See Cane, supra note 2, at 60.
16. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,112 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (discussing
the Commission's decision to adopt a particular. proposal "in light of rule 14a-8's goal of
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on policy issues relating to the operation of the companies in which they
have an ownership interest.17 Throughout the years, there has been in-
creasing tension as both shareholders and corporate management see
themselves short-changed by the process."8 Shareholders believe they are
not given enough of a voice with respect to certain issues relating to the
company's operations. Members of management, on the other hand, of-
ten feel besieged by demands they see as infringing on their own respon-
sibilities, and as a result, view the resources dedicated to the shareholder
proposal process as a waste of their time and the company's assets.' 9
A. The 1998 Amendments
In an effort to address the concerns expressed by both shareholders
and corporate management, the SEC proposed changes to its rules in the
fall of 1997.20 With respect to shareholders, the SEC's intent, as stated in
its Proposing Release, was to "make it easier for shareholders to include
a broader range of proposals in companies' proxy materials.",2' For the
benefit of companies, the SEC proposed to clarify the procedures for ex-
cluding proposals that have not met a certain threshold level of approval
in past votes.22
The SEC adopted amendments to its shareholder proposal rules on
May 28, 1998.23 In undertaking the task of revising the rules to meet the
needs of all of the parties, the SEC staff drafted the proposed rules, tak-
ing into account the extensive feedback it received from different
stakeholders involved in the process. Accordingly, in the Proposing Re-
lease, the SEC staff addressed many issues that are of great concern to all
involved. However, while the resources dedicated to the project were
well used, it is my belief that the amendments do not address the core is-
sue that gives rise to the contentious nature of the shareholder proposal
process; i.e., a sound foundation for productive communication. Fol-
lowing is a discussion of certain Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 amendments
recently adopted, along with a summary of some of the changes not
providing an avenue of communication for small investors").
17. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,682.
18. See Cane, supra note 2, passim.
19. See id. at 70 (providing the results of a survey relating to corporate attitudes on
the shareholder proposal process).
20. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,682.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
1998]
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adopted.
1. New "Plain English" Format
The SEC proposed to recast Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 using a plain
English question-and-answer format to promote a clearer understanding
of the rule.24 Some of the proposed modifications did not change the
substance of the provisions, and others were revised to reflect current in-
terpretations of the SEC or its staff.25 The SEC requested comments on
the usefulness of the question-and-answer format, and whether, in the
public's opinion, the changes reflected the SEC's interpretations.26 As a
general proposition, there was a presumption that a proposal should be
included in a company's proxy statement unless it was excludable by the
21
rule or by state law.
The Commission adopted the recommendation to recast the rule using
a plain English question-and-answer format, making this the first SEC
rule to be styled in that fashion. Several minor revisions have been
made to the proposed amendments in response to public comments, 29 re-
visions as proposed with respect to other rules,0 and minor revisions
have been made to the language of rules for which the proposed substan-
tive amendments were not adopted3' or where amendments were
adopted but the proposed language changes were rejected as a result of
12public comment:
24. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,684-85.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 50,682-83.
28. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,106-07.
29. See id. at 29,107 (citing changes to paragraph (1) under Question 9, former Rule
14a-8(c)(1)).
30. See id. (citing changes to paragraphs (8)-(11) under Question 9, former Rule 14a-8(c)(8)-(u1)).
31. See id. As discussed below, proposed substantive amendments to Rule 14a-
8(c)(5) were not adopted, and only nonsubstantive changes were made to the text of the
rule. See id.
32. See id. (referring to paragraph (7) under Question 9, former Rule 14a-8(c)(7), in
connection with which substantive changes were adopted (see infra Part III.A.2., below),
but regarding which certain recommended plain English language changes were not
made).
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2. Exclusion of a Proposal Relating to the Company's Ordinary
Business Operations-Reversal of Cracker Barrel
The Rule 14a-8(c)(7) exclusion for proposals dealing with "ordinary
business operations" has generally been one of the most used provisions
of the proxy rules as a basis for excluding shareholder proposals, and has
probably engendered more controversy than any other provision of the
shareholder proposal rules.33 The SEC designed the ordinary business
operations exclusion to prevent the introduction of shareholder propos-
als that, if adopted, would present the impractical result of shareholder
involvement in the minutiae of day-to-day operations of a company's
business.34 However, companies often relied on the provision to exclude
proposals that raised questions of considerable importance to companies
and their shareholders.35
In response to this experience, in 1975 the SEC proposed an amend-
ment that would have narrowed the exclusion in order to curb abuses by
companies. But commentators objected to the proposal, and the Com-
mission abandoned its attempt substantively to rewrite the exclusion. In-
stead, in its release adopting other amendments to Rule 14a-8, the
Commission opted to retain the existing language with respect to the ex-
clusion, but took great efforts to explain that it should be "interpreted in
a somewhat more flexible manner than in the past.
36
Specifically, while certain matters in the past had been excluded be-
cause they related to a company's ordinary business operations, the
Commission announced that those operational questions with "signifi-
cant policy, economic or other implications inherent in them ... will in
the future be considered beyond the realm of an issuer's ordinary busi-
ness operations. In the 1976 release adopting amendments to Rule
14a-8, the Commission offered examples of the types of issues that would
fall within the (c)(7) exclusion. In one example, a utility company's deci-
sion to construct a power plant would normally be considered part of the
ordinary business operations of that type of company. However, where
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., SEC Enforcement Problems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 118 (1957), cited in Proposed
Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Pro-
posals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 19,135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420, 47,428
n.45 (1982) (proposed Oct. 26, 1982).
35. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Ex-
change Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,997 (1976).
36. Id. at 52,998.
37. Id., quoted in Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 426
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
19981
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the construction involves a nuclear power plant, "the economic and
safety considerations . . . are of such magnitude that a determination
whether to construct one is not an 'ordinary' business matter."3 Thus,
the SEC staff would refuse to concur with a company's request to omit
certain proposals that related to the day-to-day operations of the com-
pany if the proposals also had significant policy or economic implica-
tions.
In a shift of interpretation, the SEC staff announced in 1992 that pro-
posals relating to a company's employment policies and practices would
no longer be viewed as an exception to the ordinary business operations
exclusion, thereby creating a "bright line" approach for employment-
related proposals.39 The event leading up to the change was a share-
holder proposal to Cracker Barrel Old Country Stores, Inc. by the New
York City Employees' Retirement System ("NYCERS") requesting that
the company implement a change in its employment policy. Specifically,
when Cracker Barrel announced a policy that it no longer would include
among its workforce "individuals . . . [who] fail to demonstrate normal
heterosexual values which have been the foundation of families in our
society,, 40 NYCERS proposed that Cracker Barrel solicit a vote on a
policy prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Cracker Barrel sought assurance from the SEC staff that the staff
would not recommend enforcement action against Cracker Barrel were it
to exclude the proposal from its proxy statement, under Rule 14a-8(c)(7),
on the ground that the proposal dealt with an employment matter related
to the ordinary business operations of the company. The SEC staff
granted "no-action" relief,4' but inserted into its general boilerplate letter
38. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange
Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998, quoted in Roosevelt, 958 F.2d at 426.
39. See Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,418, at 77,287 (Oct. 13, 1992) [hereinafter
Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter].
40. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858, 861 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) rev'd in part, New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d
7 (2d Cir. 1995).
41. See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 39, at 77,287. "No-action" let-
ters are informal responses by the SEC staff to persons or companies requesting the staff's
confirmation that it will not recommend enforcement action against the person or com-
pany for engaging in a specific course of action. No-action letters "do not impose or fix a
legal relationship upon any of the parties, [and] ... do not bind the SEC, the parties, or
the courts." New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 12 (2nd Cir.
1995) (hereinafter NYCERS) (citing Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2nd. Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, no-action letters "should not be
regarded as precedents." Procedures Regarding Public Availability of Requests for No-
Action and Interpretive Letters and Responses, Exchange Act Release No. 5,098, 35 Fed.
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an announcement changing the application of its rule to an entire class of
proposals. Specifically, the letter carved out an exception to the rule that
particular business operations-related issues may be appropriate for
shareholder consideration where they implicate significant policy con-
cerns.42 The full Commission reviewed and affirmed the staff's decision
in a letter dated January 15, 1993.43
This interpretive change announced in the Cracker Barrel no-action
letter caused much concern in the shareholder community," and has
been the subject of a lawsuit 4' and a rule change petition46 seeking a re-
versal of the SEC's position. In response to this concern, the revised rule
that appeared in the 1997 release proposed that the SEC staff revert to a
case-by-case analysis with respect to employment-related shareholder
proposals raising social policy issues, rather than automatically concur in
a decision to omit an employment-related proposal. This, in effect,
would reverse the Cracker Barrel no-action letter.47 In a concurring
Reg. 17,779, 17,779 (1970).
42.
The fact that a shareholder proposal concerning a company's employment poli-
cies and practices for the general workforce is tied to a social issue will no longer
be viewed as removing the proposal from the realm of ordinary business opera-
tions of the registrant. Rather, determinations with respect to any such proposals
are properly governed by the employment-based nature of the proposal.
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, 63
Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,107-08 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (quoting Cracker
Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 39, at 77,287).
43. Letter from Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission,
to Sue Ellen Dodell, Deputy Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York
(Jan. 15, 1993), available in 1993 WL 11,016, *1-2 (S.E.C.).
44. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 10-11 (explaining the controversy was spurred by the
SEC's change in interpretation having been announced in the context of a no-action letter
rather than in a more formal manner).
45. See id. at 7.
46. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,682 (1997) (proposed Sept. 26, 1997). In July 1995, the In-
terfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Calvert Group, Ltd., and the Comptroller of
the City of New York jointly submitted a "Petition for Rule Change" pursuant to Rule
201.400 of the SEC's Rules of Practice. See id. at 50,683 n.15. Rule 201.400 does not con-
tain a provision requiring a response from the Commission within a specific period of
time. See Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.400 (1997). Rather, the SEC's practice is to
deliver a petition to the division responsible for the subject matter of the petition, which is
then supposed to make a recommendation to the Commission with respect to a response.
In this case no action was taken on the petition, but the substance of the request was
achieved with the adoption of the May 1998 revisions to the shareholder proposal rules.
See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093,
62 Fed. Reg. at 50,688 n.71.
47. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,682, 50,688.
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statement accompanying the Proposing Release, SEC Commissioner
Wallman urged the SEC to reverse its interpretation with respect to em-
ployment-related proposals in time for the upcoming 1998 proxy season,
and not to tie that reform to the adoption of rule amendments. 48 The
proposed change ultimately was adopted along with the rule amend-
ments, 9 though not in time for the 1998 proxy season, and became effec-
tive prospectively as of May 21, 1998.50
In connection with the change, which addressed only employment-
related shareholder proposals, the Commission took the opportunity to
reiterate its position with respect to the ordinary business operations ex-
clusion.' As a general matter, the Commission stated that the "exclusion
is consistent with the policy of most state corporate laws: to confine the
resolution of ordinary business problems to management and the board
of directors, since it is impracticable for shareholders to decide how to
solve such problems at an annual shareholders meeting."52 More specifi-
cally, the policy involves two basic principles, the subject matter and the
complexity of the proposal. 3 With respect to the first, the SEC stated
that "[c]ertain tasks are so fundamental to management's ability to run a
company on a day-to-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter,
be subject to direct shareholder oversight. 54 However, reiterating the
SEC's long-standing position, the Commission went on to state that even
these types of matters would not generally be excludable by a company if
the tasks relate to "sufficiently significant social policy issues" since "the
proposals would transcend the day-to-day business matters and raise
policy issues so significant that [the proposal] would be appropriate for a
shareholder vote. 5
48. See id. at 50,706.
49. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,114 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) ("Reversal
of the [Cracker Barrel] position will result in a return to the case-by-case analysis that pre-
vailed before the position was announced.").
50. See id. at 29,108 n.33 (indicating the reversal of the position also will apply to no-
action submissions received prior to the May 21, 1998 effective date if the SEC's Division
of Corporation Finance has not already issued a response by the close of business on May
20, 1998).
51. See id. at 29,108.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id. (providing examples cited in support of this principle such as management of
the workforce (i.e., hiring, promoting and firing employees), production-related decisions
(i.e., quality and quantity), and the selection of service providers).
55. Id. (citing a 1992 no-action letter in which the SEC staff refused to allow a share-
holder proposal to be excluded when the subject matter of the proposal involved senior
executive compensation).
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With respect to the second principle, the Commission noted that mat-
ters too complex in nature could not be presented in adequate depth in a
shareholder proposal to be voted on by shareholders as a group, and
therefore, are management's responsibility. 6 Examples of such matters
would be proposals involving intricate detail, proposals seeking to im-
pose specific time-frames for taking action on a matter, or methods for
"implementing complex policies," although such proposals are not per se
within the definition of "ordinary business" and therefore excludable
under the rule. 7
The Commission also determined that it would be prudent to retain
the reference to the exclusion as pertaining to the "ordinary business op-
erations" of a company, rather than change the term as originally pro-
posed. 8 The change was proposed since the phrase "ordinary business"
was used as a legal term of art and therefore might be confusing to some
investors seeking to use the rule. 9 For the same reason, however, it was
decided that the phrase should be retained since, as stated by com-
menters from both the corporate and shareholder communities, this term
of art now carries with it so much interpretive baggage that a change in
terminology might be misconstrued as a change in interpretation.60
B. Proposed Amendments Not Adopted
1. Exclusion of a Proposal that Set Forth a Personal Claim or
Grievance
Rule 14a-8(c)(4)61 permitted companies to exclude a proposal that (1)
related to a personal claim or grievance, or (2) furthered a personal in-
terest not shared by shareholders as a group. Under the rule, when a
company asserted that a proposal had been put forth by a shareholder
for one of the purposes stated above, the SEC staff undertook an evalua-
tion of the factual claim in order to determine whether to concur with the
62
company's request to exclude the proposal.
56. See id. (citing the 1976 Rule 14a-8 amendments).
57. Id. at 29,109 ("Timing questions, for instance, could involve significant policy
where large differences are at stake, and proposals may seek a reasonable level of detail
without running afoul of these considerations.").
58. See id. at 29,107.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 29,107.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4) (1997).
62. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,686 (1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed
Sept. 26, 1997).
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Under the proposed rule, the SEC would concur with a company's re-
quest to exclude a proposal only if the proposal "relate[d] to a personal
grievance or special interest" by its terms." If a proposal were neutral, a
company would still need to submit to the SEC staff its request to omit
the proposal from its proxy statement, but the staff would automatically
express "no view" instead of concurring or declining to concur with the
request to exclude the proposal.6 The proposed change reflected the
Commission's "view that the Division's ability to make the necessary fac-
tual findings is limited in the context of evaluating an otherwise 'facially
neutral' proposal, and that companies and shareholders themselves pos-
sess much of the factual information relevant to the applicability of the
'personal grievance' exclusion."65
The SEC considered the proposed revision and ultimately determined
not to adopt it. As a result of "serious concerns" expressed in comment
letters, the Commission agreed that the proposed revision "might in-
crease the likelihood of disputes between shareholders and companies,"
and determined that it is preferable to make case-by-case decisions re-
garding whether a particular proposal merits exclusion from a proxy
statement.66
2. Exclusion of a Proposal with Little Economic Relevance to the
Company's Business
Rule 14a-8(c)(5) 67 permitted a company to exclude a proposal if (1) it
was not significantly related to the company's business, and (2) the pro-
posal related to operations that accounted for (a) less than 5% of the
company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and (b) for
less than 5% of the company's net earnings and gross sales for its most
recent fiscal year.68 Whether a proposal is deemed "significantly related"
to the company's business has required subjective determinations that
have been difficult for the SEC staff to administer.6' Even with the addi-tion of 5% standards in 1983, the subjective portion of the rule often has
63. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,112.
64. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39, 093, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,686.
65. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,112.
66. Id.
67. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5).
68. Id.
69. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,113.
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precluded companies from omitting certain proposals. °
The SEC proposed to delete the requirement that a proposal not be
"significantly related" to a company's business in order to render it ex-
cludable.1 What would remain would be a purely economic standard
whereby a company could exclude a proposal if it related to services or
products representing "$10 million or less in gross revenue or total
cost[I." 72 An alternative test also was proposed that would produce a
lower threshold for the benefit of smaller companies.73
The SEC proposed four safeguards to prevent the omission of propos-
als that may be significant, notwithstanding an inability to meet the value
test: (1) the exclusion would not be available if quantification was not
practicable or the results would be unreliable; (2) availability of the
lower threshold for smaller companies; (3) availability of the exclusion
only where proposals related to "the purchase or sale of products and
services;" and (4) availability of an "'override' mechanism.,
74
The proposal did not receive much public support and the SEC chose
not to adopt it.75 While commenters from the corporate community
"agreed in concept" with the change, the consensus seemed to be that
the proposed $10 million threshold was too low to make the exclusion
70. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,686.
71. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,113.
72. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,586.
73. See id. at 50,686-87.
74. See id. at 50,687. A feature of the proposed rule was a mechanism for overriding
a company's decision to exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy statement. In or-
der to invoke the mechanism, a shareholder would have been required to demonstrate
that the holders of at least 3% of the company's outstanding shares (which could include
the proponent's own shares) agreed that the proposal should be included in the proxy
statement. See id. at 50,690. The shareholder would be required to document that sup-
port. While under the present system a shareholder may bring suit against a company to
prevent it from excluding the proposal from the proxy statement, the courts are not always
in a position to make a timely determination of the issue. The override mechanism, there-
fore, had the potential to avert litigation that is costly and time consuming for both parties.
The proposed changes were excluded from the final rule amendments, with the SEC citing
opposition and/or concern expressed in the comment letters. See Amendments to Rules
on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,113
(1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). On the one hand, objections were raised that
the "proposed 3% threshold may be too low and lead to erosion of the 'ordinary business'
and 'relevance' exclusions that would be subject to an override," and on the other hand
"[s]ome shareholders thought ... that 3% support of a company's shareownership would
be too difficult for a shareholder proponent to obtain." Id.
75. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,113.
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readily available to companies.76 Concerns expressed from the share-
holder community included the potential difficulty to quantify the ap-
propriate economic level with respect to a particular proposal, notwith-
standing the safeguards.77
3. Resubmission Thresholds
The SEC proposed to raise the thresholds for resubmitting a proposal
that had been presented to shareholders for a vote but failed to pass.
Rule 14a-8(c)(12) 78 currently permits a company to omit a proposal if it
has not received at least: (1) 3% of the vote on its first submission;
(2) 6% of the vote on its second submission; and (3) 10% of the vote on
its third submission.79 The revised rule would have permitted a company
to omit a proposal that did not receive at least: (1) 6% of the vote on its
first submission; (2) 15% of the vote on its second submission; and
(3) 30% of the vote on its third submission."
One of the SEC's purposes in proposing the significantly higher
thresholds was to address the concerns expressed by companies that they
receive too many proposals that bear little relevance to their businesses."
In addition, it was believed that the other proposed revisions would in-
crease the number of shareholder proposals included in yearly proxy
statements, so that the higher thresholds would serve as a counter-
balance." Nevertheless, in response to concerns expressed by com-
menters from the shareholder community, the proposed revision was not
adopted 3
C. Shareholder Communications
1. Pre-1992
While the ability of shareholders to communicate with each other on
matters of importance was enhanced by using the proxy statement to dis-
seminate knowledge of issues of concern, the question ultimately became
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(12) (1997).
79. See id.
80. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,689 (1997) (proposed Sept. 26, 1997).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,113 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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whether the dissemination of proxy statements was a sufficient means of
having an issue debated among shareholders.84 The problem arose be-
cause of the increasingly expanding application of what types of commu-
nications constituted a "solicitation" requiring the filing of a proxy
statement with the SEC.85
Specifically, when the Commission promulgated the proxy rules in
1935 to promote "fair corporate suffrage," application of the rules was
limited to "solicitations" in connection with a request for a proxy or
other consent to act from security holders." Over the years, however,
the SEC expanded the definition of "solicitation" until in 1956 it applied
to "'any communication' which could be viewed as being 'reasonably cal-
culated' to influence a shareholder to give, deny or revoke a proxy."87
The probably unintended result was "potentially to turn almost every
expression of opinion concerning a publicly traded corporation into a
regulated proxy solicitation" requiring compliance with the proxy rules.8
For example, newspaper articles, public speeches, oral commentary via
the media, and even private conversations among more than ten share-
holders might invoke the proxy rules.89
The determination of whether the rules applied depended on whether
the communication was deemed to have been a solicitation. Because the
evaluation of whether a solicitation had taken place occurred after the
fact, those persons communicating with others or making statements
could not know for certain at the time the communication was made
whether there had been a "solicitation" requiring compliance with the
proxy rules.0 If a solicitation was deemed to have been made, the rami-
fication was that proxy materials would have to be distributed to all those
deemed to have been solicited.9 If the rules were invoked by a commu-
nication in the public media, all shareholders were deemed to have been
solicited, forcing the communicator to deal with burdensome and costly
compliance.92
As a practical matter, however, if no materials were distributed at the
84. See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release
No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 85,051, at 83,357 (Oct. 16,
1992).
85. See id. at 83,356.
86. Id. at 83,355-56.
87. Id. at 83,356.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 83,358.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 83,356.
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time the communication was made and the statements were later deemed
to constitute a solicitation, then a violation of the law had occurred. The
unfortunate result of this broadened definition of "solicitation" was to
deter discussions by shareholders and other interested persons.93 Some
institutional shareholders may have been in a position to launch a solici-
tation on their own, but even then the result was not a free flow of in-
formation.94
2. Post-1992
Recognizing that more should be done to increase the ability of share-
holders to communicate with each other, the SEC adopted new rules in
1992 to replace existing ones that "created unnecessary regulatory im-
pediments to communication among shareholders and others and to the
effective use of shareholder voting rights." 95 Under the new rules, per-
sons who qualify for the exemption may make announcements to the
public or contact select shareholders to debate critical issues. The Com-
mission's purpose in adopting these amendments is "to foster the free
and unrestrained expression of views ... by the removal of any regula-
tory cost, burden or uncertainty that could have the effect of deterring
the free expression of views by disinterested shareholders who do not
seek [proxy] authority for themselves.
9 6
The rule explicitly exempts from the proxy rules persons who: (1) are
not seeking proxy authority, and (2) do not have a substantial interest in
the matter,97 unless they fall within the categories of persons not entitled
to claim the exemption.. Solicitations "made by means of speeches in
93. See id.
94. See id. at 83,359.
95. Id. at 83,355. In adopting the shareholders' communications amendments to the
proxy rules, the SEC intended to: (1) "eliminate unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the
exchange of views and opinions by shareholders and others concerning management per-
formance and initiatives presented for a vote of shareholders"; (2) "lower the regulatory
costs of conducting a regulated solicitation by management, shareholders and others by
minimizing regulatory costs related to the dissemination of solicitation materials"; and (3)
"remove unnecessary limitations on shareholders' use of their voting rights, and improve
disclosure to shareholders in the context of a solicitation as well as in the reporting of
voting results." Id. at 83,353.
96. Id. at 83,359.
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1997). An exception to the rule, prohibiting false
and misleading statements, continues to apply. See id. § 240.14a-9.
98. See id. § 240.14a-2(b). Persons who may not rely on the exemption are:
(i) [tihe registrant or an affiliate or associate of the registrant (other than an offi-
cer or director or any person serving in a similar capacity); (ii) [a]n officer or di-
rector of the registrant or any person serving in a similar capacity engaging in a
solicitation financed.., by the registrant; (iii) [a]n officer, director, affiliate or as-
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public forums, press releases, published or broadcast opinions, state-
ments, or advertisements appearing in a broadcast media, newspaper,
magazine or other bona fide publication disseminated on a regular basis"
do not require that the person making the communication disseminate
proxy material to all solicited persons.99 This exemption is conditioned
on (1) no form of proxy, consent or authorization being provided to a se-
curity holder in connection with the communication,0 and (2) there be-
ing on file with the SEC a definitive proxy statement 0' A Notice of Ex-
empt Solicitation must be filed with the SEC by certain persons,1"" though
excluded from the notice requirement are oral solicitations (unless
scripts are used), "speeches delivered in a public forum, press releases,
published or broadcast opinions, statements, and advertisements ap-
pearing in a broadcast media, or a newspaper, magazine or other bona
fide publication disseminated on a regular basis."1 °3
sociate of a person that is ineligible to rely on the exemption ... [other than the
registrant], or any person serving in a similar capacity; (iv) [a]ny nominee for
whose election as a director proxies are solicited; (v) [a]ny person soliciting in
opposition to a merger, recapitalization, reorganization, sale of assets or other
extraordinary transaction recommended or approved by the board of directors of
the registrant who is proposing or intends to propose an alternative transaction
to which such person or one of its affiliates is a party; (vi) [a]ny person who is re-
quired to report beneficial ownership of the registrant's equity securities on a
Schedule 13D (§ 240.13d-101), unless such person has filed a Schedule 13D and
has not disclosed pursuant to item 4 thereto an intent, or reserved the right, to
engage in a control transaction, or any contested solicitation for the election of
directors; (vii) [a]ny person who receives compensation from an ineligible person
directly related to the solicitation of proxies, other than pursuant to § 240.14a-13;
(viii) [w]here the registrant is an investment company registered under the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. [§] 80a-1 et seq.), an 'interested per-
son' of that investment company, as that term is defined in section 2(a)(19) of the
Investment Company Act (15 U.S.C. [§] 80a-2); (ix) [any person who, because of
a substantial interest in the subject matter of the solicitation, is likely to receive a
benefit from a successful solicitation that would not be shared pro rata by all
other holders of the same class of securities, other than a benefit arising from the
person's employment with the registrant; and (x) [a]ny person acting on behalf of
any of the foregoing.
Id.
99. Id. § 240.14a-3(f).
100. Id. § 240.14a-3(f)(1).
101. See id. § 240.14a-3(f)(2).
102. See id. § 240.14a-6(g)(1)(ii). Persons beneficially owning more than $5 million
(market value) of the securities for which a solicitation is made must file with the SEC a
Notice of Exempt Solicitation and copies of the written solicitations delivered to share-
holders. See id. The Commission deemed this notice to be "the simplest means to get
written soliciting material into the public domain." Regulation of Communications
Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,051, at 83,361 (Oct. 16, 1992).
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g)(2).
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A safe harbor has been provided for shareholder announcements of
voting decisions by excluding from the definition of "solicitation" state-
ments of how a security holder intends to vote. °4 Additionally, in con-
nection with a proxy solicitation and on request of a shareholder, a com-
pany either must provide a shareholder list to the requesting
shareholder, or mail the shareholder's soliciting materials to all share-
holders."95
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
The SEC staff has, on many occasions, expressed an interest in re-
fraining from the line-drawing inherent in evaluating whether a share-
holder proposal is excludable under the SEC's rules. The author sug-
gests that, with appropriate regulatory guidance during the critical period
prior to an annual or special meeting, the SEC may succeed in doing
what it has not been able to achieve before. Specifically, by providing a
mechanism to foster communications either on an on-going basis or at
least when concern about an issue first arises, the parties may be able to
agree on how to address the problem in a nonconfrontational forum. Al-
ternatively, should the matter be one that is appropriate for a vote by the
entire shareholder body, the parties may be able to craft the proposal af-
ter productive discussions with mutual input. Either way, the SEC staff
is virtually removed from the process, at least from the perspective of no-
action requests. Following are some suggestions as to how those ideals
might be achieved.
A common foundation for all of the suggestions, as one might expect,
is healthy communication. Nevertheless, the timing of that communica-
tion is the key to avoiding conflict. Communications should be on-going
and productive, with each company setting up a mechanism to solicit in-
put from shareholders and thereby create a friendly environment. Like-
wise, from the shareholders' perspective, communications must never
104. See id. § 240.14a-1(I)(2)(iv). In order to qualify for the safe harbor, the communi-
cation must be (1) "made by means of speeches in public forums, press releases, published
or broadcast opinions, statements, or advertisements appearing in a broadcast media, or
newspaper, magazine or other bona fide publication disseminated on a regular basis," (2)
"directed to persons to whom the security holder owes a fiduciary duty in connection with
the voting of securities of a registrant held by the security holder," or (3) "made in re-
sponse to unsolicited requests for additional information with respect to a prior communi-
cation by the security holder made pursuant to [the safe harbor provision.]" Id. § 240.14a-
1(l)(2)(iv)(A)-(C).
105. See id. § 240.14a-7 (explaining that the company has the option of electing either
to provide a list or mail the materials; in the case of a roll-up transaction or if a proposal is
subject to Rule 13e-3, however, the requesting shareholder selects between the alterna-
tives).
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begin with the shareholder proposal process or by making demands of
management using a shareholder proposal as the punishment for failing
to accede to a shareholder's demands. Rather, communications should
be used to facilitate dialogue among the parties and thereby enhance the
company's position in its community of shareholders. After all, a com-
pany chooses to be public and accordingly accepts with that status the
obligation to recognize the ownership interests of its shareholders and
the rights those interests convey on an on-going basis, not just once a
year.
By the same token, when an issue is appropriate for consideration by
the shareholder body as a whole, the shareholder proposal should be
seen for what it is-an efficient method of disseminating important in-
formation to the shareholder body in connection with the solicitation of a
proxy. When shareholders use the threat of a shareholder proposal to
try to gain leverage, or when management rushes to exclude a share-
holder proposal as a first course of action, both parties act in bad faith
and miss the point of the proposal process. For better or for worse,
shareholders and management are parties to a marriage in a jurisdiction
that does not permit divorce. It is time to take advantage of the partner-
ship and channel resources toward the common benefit of the company
and its stakeholders.
A. Corporate Department of Shareholder Relations
Companies often designate a person or department to "guard the
door" from the nuisance of shareholder inquiries. That function is often
served by the Legal Department, whose members instinctively protect
their client, generally have no special training in public relations, and
may not be the best representatives of a company to discuss business pol-
icy with shareholders or members of the public. At the same time, the
prospect of visiting the company's lawyer hardly fosters an environment
for a comfortable chat from a shareholder's perspective, whether institu-
tional or individual. Some companies channel initial shareholder com-
munications to the corporate secretary's office, which, like the Legal De-
partment, has an identifiable regulatory function when it comes to
shareholder relations and is not necessarily the ideal first contact for a
shareholder seeking information.
Some companies, particularly those providing consumer goods, have a
consumer relations department or even a shareholder relations group,
which can be an excellent forum for an initial inquiry into an aspect of
company business that interests the shareholder. From the other per-
spective, many institutional investors have internal procedures for initi-
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ating dialogue with the companies they own, and often succeed in man-
aging the relationship so as to achieve results without breeding conflict.
Unfortunately, however, there are no regulatory standards to guide
companies as to what is expected of them with respect to shareholder
relations. The principal regulatory provisions that do apply to a com-
pany's relationship with its shareholders address disclosure issues and the
shareholder proposal process, neither of which invites a two-way dialogue.
Standards designed to create a forum for the acquisition of information
could provide shareholders with a primary source of information directly
from the company they own, as well as a means of requesting more for-
mal communications with management. As an initial approach such an
organization could ultimately dissuade more adversarial contacts. The
SEC staff has stated informally that there is little the SEC can do to di-
rect how communications are carried on outside of the proxy rules; it ap-
pears, however, that there is a great deal the SEC could do.
Specifically, a useful development would be to standardize, to a certain
degree, the level of corporate communications resources available to
shareholders. This standardization could be accomplished by requiring,
either by regulation or interpretive pronouncement, that companies de-
vise procedures for enabling shareholders to express their concerns to
management. Companies should also be encouraged, though they would
not be mandated, to go beyond reactive communications by proactively
seeking out shareholder feedback.
By undertaking rulemaking or an interpretive pronouncement, the
SEC would fill a void that currently exists in the area of corporate-
shareholder relations. There are rules mandating that companies make
certain disclosures available for public review, but the disclosures are in
writing and do not, by their nature, foster two-way communication.
Likewise, there are rules governing the shareholder proposal process,
whereby shareholders submit a voting item to be read by other share-
holders, management issues a written statement expressing its views on
the matter, and still no one talks.
In connection with a rulemaking or interpretive initiative, the SEC
could provide examples of how effective communications might be
achieved. For example, companies could avail themselves of the exten-
sive options available in the electronic medium to reach out to their
shareholder constituencies. A corporate Web-site could link to a mail-
box monitored by personnel trained to respond to shareholder issues. A
company might establish e-mail links to shareholders to which regular
communications are sent. In short, the goal would be to establish more
regularized interactive contact for all companies for the purpose of
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building a rapport among the parties. This would provide shareholders
with important information about matters taking place within their com-
pany, and would give shareholders the opportunity to provide feedback
when such activities are taking place.
While setting up such a procedure would involve substantial effort on
the part of companies, the resulting quality of the company's relationship
with its shareholders would make the effort worthwhile. This should not
be read to suggest that companies should invite shareholders to participate
in the day-to-day management of the company, but rather the goal would
be to keep shareholders apprised of activities in a manner calculated to
foster an atmosphere of mutual trust.
Such regular communications would encourage greater cooperation
when important issues arise with respect to which the shareholder wants
to provide input. Companies should be encouraged to "partner" with
their shareholders to create mutually acceptable solutions in the same
way corporate America joins hands with government and self-regulatory
organizations in an effort to produce legislation and regulation that re-
flects the needs of the corporate community. Just as companies attempt
to avoid unworkable regulatory surprises by taking an active role in for-
mulating government initiatives, companies can conceivably avoid what
unfortunately is viewed as the dreaded proxy season spate of shareholder
initiatives by working with shareholders throughout the year to address
concerns on an ongoing basis. Certain issues may not be appropriately
addressed solely by corporate outreach-for example, by questionnaires
soliciting shareholders' views on a particular issue for management con-
sideration-but rather merit a vote by the entire shareholder body.
Management's ongoing partnership with shareholders should help the
company avoid unpleasant surprises, and likewise may help encourage
less resistance to shareholder access to the proxy statement. Instead of
the new year ringing in increased tension as the company braces for
proxy season, the company, as an active partner with shareholders, could
help give direction to the proxy statement's contents with respect to
shareholder proposals, or at least have a better understanding of the is-
sues being proposed so as to avoid a confrontation.
B. SEC Office of Corporate-Shareholder Relations
Taking a cue from the success of the SEC's Office of Investor Educa-
tion and Assistance, the SEC should consider forming an independent
Office of Corporate-Shareholder Relations or Office of Corporate Gov-
ernance. Together with SEC pronouncements on expectations with re-
spect to setting up procedures to encourage regular shareholder commu-
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nications and outreach programs, the role of the Office would be to assist
institution-building in a way that could have a lasting, positive influence
on corporate-shareholder relations.
The Office could serve as a clearinghouse for information on the types
of programs that have proven successful in developing a healthy rapport
with shareholders. The Director of the Office could establish outreach
and training sessions designed to encourage companies to evaluate their
effectiveness in communicating with shareholders. Partnering programs
could be developed whereby companies further along in the process
would be willing to serve as "mentors" to help other companies imple-
ment their programs, thus extending the Office's resources.
Associations and organizations tend to serve either companies or
shareholders, thus having the unintended (and unfortunate) consequence
of fostering the polarization of the partners and fomenting mistrust and
contention in their dealings. In contrast, programs that the office could
establish would have the potential to become popular fora for the ex-
change of ideas that will help enhance the regularization of corporate-
shareholder communications and provide an opportunity for nonadver-
sarial contact between the corporate and shareholder communities.
V. A GOAL FOR THE FUTURE
The SEC is at a crossroads in corporate-shareholder relations. Having
just reversed the interpretation originally announced in the Cracker Bar-
rel no-action letter,' 6 the SEC must take affirmative steps to make cer-
tain that the environment that induced the SEC to issue the Cracker Bar-
rel position does not recur.
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has called on American business to prac-
tice "responsive corporate governance." ' 7 He emphasizes the impor-
tance of full and fair disclosure, and the responsibilities of board mem-
bers as fiduciaries acting on behalf of the company's shareholders.'08 But
if history provides any lessons, we must know that an improvement in the
sometimes strained relations between management and shareholders,
unless coaxed, will take too long to make a meaningful difference any-
time soon.
Accordingly, the SEC should act immediately by charting a course dif-
ferent from the one that has engendered so much debate over the past
106. See supra Section I1I.A.2.
107. Arthur Levitt, Corporate Governance: Integrity in the Information Age, Remarks
at Tulane University (Mar. 12, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch206.txt>.
108. See id. at 2-3.
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twenty-five years but has not settled the issues. Specifically, the SEC
should step back from its focus on the shareholder proposal process. In-
stead, it should encourage companies to assign shareholder relations
functions to a dedicated group of employees, and adopt procedures that
foster outreach and a free flow of information between companies and
their shareholders. In an effort to help achieve these goals, the SEC
should establish an Office of Corporate-Shareholder Relations to popu-
larize the notion that effective communication is a strategy that produces
winners in all camps.
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